This paper clariÞes and extends previous work on the equivalence between monetary regimes and Þscal regimes involving social security systems. We consider equivalence across regimes, showing that monetary regimes are equivalent to one or both of two alternative types of social security regimes. Two implications emerge. One is that Þnanciing a real expenditure by increasing the inßation rate is equivalent, across regimes, to Þnancing the expenditure by increasing the tax rate on social security beneÞts. In addition, our results imply that a wide range of monetary policy actions are equivalent, across regimes, to Þscal policy actions that change the scale of the social security system and the tax rates on social security beneÞts and/or bank deposits.
Introduction
Inßation imposes a tax that generates revenue for the government. The public Þnance approach to monetary/macroeconomic theory uses this fact as a starting point for its analysis of monetary policy. This approach is grounded on explicit consideration of a uniÞed government budget constraint that includes revenue from the inßation tax, revenue from direct taxes, and revenue absorbed or produced by the government debt. With government purchases constant, monetary policy actions that alter the rate and/or the base of the inßation tax must be accompanied by changes in Þscal policy instruments. In general, more than one type of Þscal policy adjustment will be possible, and the effects of a given change in monetary policy may depend critically on the particular type of adjustment that occurs.
The public Þnance approach has been frequently used to address a recurring question in Peled (1985) and Sargent and Smith (1987) . In this literature, each contributor begins with a description of a monetary regime with a Þscal component and goes on to investigate whether changes in monetary policy within that regime can be irrelevant. 1 In this paper, we take the monetary-irrelevance literature a step further. We investigate whether a monetary regime can itself be irrelevant, in the sense that any allocation supported by such a regime can also be supported by a Þscal regime that does not include Þat money or other unbacked government liabilities. 2 When this is the case, we can think of the two types of regimes as being equivalent to each other. For this reason, we use the term "equivalence," rather than "irrelevance," to characterize our results. 3 1 In the realm of Þscal policy, within-regime equivalence results have a history that dates back to Ricardo, and, in modern times, to Barro (1974) . 2 There is also a literature that asks whether the allocations supported by particular monetary policy regimes can be supported by monetary policy regimes of a different type. Examples include Mourmouras and Russell (1992) and Bacchetta and Caminal (1994) . 3 
1
The cross-regime equivalence results we obtain in this paper are potentially important for at least two reasons. First, they may improve our understanding of the role of money and monetary arrangements by identifying Þscal arrangements that can play the same role.
Second, cross-regime equivalence means that changes in monetary policy are equivalent to changes in Þscal policy. So we may be able to use Þscal policy analysis to help us understand the results of monetary policy experiments. Even further, we may be even be able to use models of Þscal policy to draw inferences about the results of monetary policy experiments without adding monetary features to the models. 4 Our analysis builds on previous research on the role of money in overlapping generations (OLG) models. The work of pioneers such as Samuelson (1959) , Shell (1971) , and Wallace (1980) demonstrated that in OLG models, Þat currency and other unbacked government liabilities may have value because they allow agents to conduct intergenerational exchanges they could not arrange without assistance from the government. 5 These authors also recognized that the effects of these exchanges are very similar to the effects of class of Þscal policies that the model is well suited to study -pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems, in which lump-sum taxes on young agents Þnance transfers to old agents.
More recent work has succeeded in constructing two sides of a rigorous theoretical triangle linking social security, unbacked government debt, and Þat currency. The Þrst side of the triangle is developed in McCandless and Wallace (1993) . They show that any real allocation supportable by a social security system can be supported by a government policy regime involving unbacked government bonds and transfer payments Þnanced by revenue from bond
The process of constructing the equivalence results that were cited in the preceding paragraph has been summarized by Sargent (1987, p. 304) , as follows: One starts by assuming that "government and private securities exist and are valued in an initial equilibrium, with a given speciÞcation of government policy strategies. Holding the consumption allocations associated with this initial equilibrium Þxed, one solves the equilibrium conditions for the class of government policies that supports this same allocation in equilibrium." Our procedure is analogous, but different. We choose a speciÞcation of government policy strategies that is completely different from the initial speciÞcation -a speciÞcation that features Þscal policy strategies rather than monetary policy strategies. Then we look for a single government policy, within this new policy-strategy speciÞcation, that supports the initial allocation in equilibrium. 4 For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , in the introduction to their well-known analysis of Þscal policy, comment that "There is only one type of government debt in this model and no money. Hence, the question of inßation and the distortions caused by the interaction of real and nominal magnitudes cannot be addressed. ... Introducing money into the model in a satisfactory way would constitute an enormous task." (page 12). Our results indicate that it may be possible to use the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model to study the effects of certain monetary policy experiments without adding monetary features to the model. 5 For our purposes, government debt is said to be unbacked if it is not accompanied by a stream of future surpluses in the government's budget, net of interest and currency seigniorage, of equal present value. In some cases, unbacked debt is serviced out of future currency seigniorage revenues; in others, it is rolled over forever.
sales. Sargent (1987) develops the second side of the triangle, establishing that exchanges of unbacked bonds for Þat currency, or vice-versa (open market operations), are irrelevant -a result which implies that monetary regimes with Þat currency are equivalent to regimes with unbacked government debt. 6 In both cases, the analytical framework is a pure exchange OLG model in which money yields the same real return as competing stores of value. We provide the last side of this triangle, using a version of the same model to prove explicitly (in Theorem 1, and Corollary 1) that any allocation supported by a monetary regime with Þat currency and/or unbacked government debt can be supported as a Þscal regime with PAYG social security, and vice-versa.
In addition, we extend this literature, asking whether this equivalence result can hold in OLG models in which money is return-dominated. We pose this question in a setup in which money is valued only if the government imposes legal restrictions on intertemporal trade. This is the same type of question Sargent and Smith (1987) asked and answered about the within-regimes equivalence result obtained by Wallace (1981) . Previous work relevant to this question includes Romer (1985) , who asserts, without providing a formal proof, that any real allocation supported by a monetary regime involving Þat currency and reserve requirements can also be supported by a regime involving government bonds backed partly, but not completely, by direct taxes on the returns on bank deposits. The formal proof is provided by Bacchetta and Caminal (1994) , who also extend Romer's analysis to situations in which the government is earning revenue from currency seigniorage. 7 ,8 To our knowledge, however, there has never been any work on the relationship between monetary regimes with reserve requirements or other legal restrictions and "purely Þscal" regimes with social security systems but no monetary features.
The principal result of our analysis is that any allocation supported by a monetary regime with Þat currency, reserve requirements, and currency seigniorage, possibly in combination with unbacked government debt and bond seigniorage, can also be supported by a Þscal regime with PAYG social security plus taxes on social security beneÞts and/or deposit returns.
We present two versions of this result, featuring social security schemes of two different types.
The Þrst version features a social security scheme in which young households' contributions are Þnanced by a proportional tax on their saving. These contributions are used to pay beneÞts, to old agents, that are proportional to the contributions they made when they were young. The government may tax these beneÞts in order to Þnance a real expenditure. Under this scheme, the pre-tax beneÞts paid by the social security system are Þnanced entirely by current social security contributions, and the pre-tax return rate on these contributions is equal to the population growth rate. The second version of the result features a lumpsum social security system. Under this system, however, the pre-tax return rate on social security contributions is higher than the population growth rate, and the government imposes a proportional tax on bank deposits to help Þnance the social security beneÞts. 9 ,10 Our results shed light on a long-standing question in monetary economics: How is the inßation tax similar to direct taxes? We show that monetary equilibria in which the monetary policy imposes an inßation tax are equivalent to social security equilibria in which the government levies a proportional tax on social security beneÞts. This equivalence holds whether or not Þat money is dominated in rate of return (which, in our model, is whether or not the government uses binding reserve requirements to create or augment the demand for Þat money). The precise relationship between the value of the inßation rate under the monetary regime and the value of the tax rate on social security beneÞts under the equivalent Þscal regime depends partly on the nature of the monetary regime. In Proposition 1, we describe these two regimes as either one in which the reserve requirement is not binding, or one in which unbacked government debt is excluded and the reserve requirement is binding. In Proposition 2, we show that a monetary equilibrium with Þat currency, reserve requirements and government debt is equivalent to a mixed equilibrium with unbacked government debt 9 This version of the equivalence result is inspired by, and can be viewed as an extension of, Romer (1985) and Bacchetta and Caminal (1994) . 10 Although our discussion of these results focuses on the ability of social security regimes to support monetary equilibria, we prove the results in both directions: that is, we also show that social security equilibria can be supported as monetary equilibria. In some cases, these equivalent monetary equilibria require supplementary lump-sum taxes on the old (but not the young) households. In addition, although our discussion focuses on steady states, we prove our results for equilibria of all types.
and a saving-based social security system, but no Þat currency or reserve requirements. For all pairs of monetary and Þscal regimes listed, an increase in the inßation rate to Þnance a larger real expenditure has exactly the same impact as an increase in the tax rate on social security beneÞts.
In this paper, we demonstrate that monetary policy actions -changes in the money growth rate, open market operations or changes in the reserve ratio -are equivalent, across regimes, to changes in Þscal policy. These Þscal policy changes may include changes in the scale of the social security system (that is, changes in the level of social security taxes and beneÞts), and changes in the tax rates on social security beneÞts or returns on bank deposits. Thus, we can use Þscal policy analysis, which is relatively well understood, to help us understand the real effects of monetary policy actions. In addition, we can use the real effects of Þscal policy actions to predict the real effects of monetary policy actions in the equivalent monetary regimes. This result opens the door to using models of Þscal policy to study the real effects of monetary policy, even when the models in question do not have any monetary features.
We can illustrate the potential usefulness of our analysis by using it to provide some "non-monetary" intuition about one of the best-known results in the theory of overlapping generations models with money: Freeman's (1987) optimal reserve requirements theorem.
Freeman studies an economy in which households save by depositing funds at Þnancial intermediaries whose assets consist of physical investments (stored goods) and required reserves of Þat currency. The government imposes the reserve requirement in order to Þnance a real purchase via currency seigniorage. Freeman shows that the optimal choice for the reserve ratio is the lowest ratio feasible -a ratio that produces a hyperinßation.
In Freeman's model, we show that a monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements is equivalent to a Þscal equilibrium with a pay-as-you-go social security system. In the monetary equilibrium, there is a government purchase Þnanced by an inßation tax; in the Þscal equilibrium, this purchase is Þnanced by a direct tax on social security beneÞts. We can use this equivalent Þscal equilibrium to describe the "Þscal logic" behind Freeman's result. It begins with the fact that pay-as-you go social security provides intergenerational transfers at a pre-tax return rate equal to the population growth rate, while physical investment, under
Freeman's assumptions, offers a higher return rate. Thus, social security is an inefficient system for reallocating resources from young to old households, and the best social security system is the smallest one that allows the government to raise the required revenue by taxing the beneÞts. Under this optimal system, the beneÞts tax rate is 100 percent: the beneÞts, and the contributions that Þnance them, are just large enough to Þnance the government purchase.
Since there are no after-tax beneÞts, there are no inefficient intergenerational transfers. The monetary analogue of this system is a reserve requirements regime in which the gross return rate on reserves is zero, so that the reserves are conÞscated by the government and provide no return to the banks or their depositors. The government conÞscates the reserves by engineering a hyperinßation. Each period, the intermediaries buy all their currency reserves from the government, paying exactly the quantity of goods the government needs to Þnance its purchase. Next period, the hyperinßation has rendered the existing currency stock worthless, so the intermediaries who purchase currency reserves must again buy all of them from the government.
In the next section of the paper, we lay out the model we will use for our analysis. In Section 3, we use two alternative speciÞcations of this model to obtain the equivalence results described earlier in this introduction. In Section 4, we provide two additional examples that are intended to illustrate further some of the ways in which our results can help us understand and predict the effects of changes in monetary policy. Section 5 concludes the paper. 11 2 The model
Basics
The model we employ is a standard two-period overlapping generations model. Time is discrete and inÞnite in one direction, beginning at date 1 and continuing at dates 2, 3, ... .
At date 1 there are N 0 > 0 agents, the members of generation 0 (the initial old), who live for a single period. At each date t ≥ 1 a generation of two-period lived agents is born; they live and consume, etc. at dates t and t + 1. There are N t members of this "generation t", with
There is a single consumption good that is (possibly) storable using a linear technology: If k t > 0 units of the good are placed in storage at date t then x k t units are recovered at date t + 1, where x ≥ 0. 12 Each member of each generation t ≥ 1 has identical preferences over consumption bundles (c 1t , c 2,t+1 ), measured in units of the consumption good. These preferences are assumed to be representable by a utility function u(c 1 , c 2 ) with standard features. The agents come 11 The proofs of the equivalence results appear in Appendix A. 
Assets and intermediation
All transactions involving assets are intermediated through zero-cost, competitive banks.
Variety B agents borrow by issuing consumption-loan liabilities to these banks and Variety
A agents save by holding the banks' deposit liabilities. We denote the values deposited or borrowed s j t , j = A, B, where s A t will be positive (saving/depositing) and s B t will be negative (borrowing). The potential assets of the banks are consumption loans, stored goods, government bonds, and Þat currency. The markets for all these assets are perfectly competitive.
The gross real rate of return on consumption loans extended at date t is denoted R t . The goods price of a unit of Þat currency at date t is denoted p t . If Þat currency is valued, so that p t > 0 for all t ≥ 1, then its gross real return rate from date t to date t + 1 is R m t ≡ p t+1 /p t ≡ 1/Π t , where Π t is the gross inßation rate from date t to date t + 1. For simplicity, if Þat currency is not valued then we set R m t = 0. Government bonds are one-period consumption bonds; their gross real rate of return is R b t . Without loss of generality, we assume that the banks hold the same portfolio on behalf of each Variety A agent born at a given date. The quantity of goods stored on behalf of a Variety A agent at date t is denoted k A t . The real present value of the bonds held for each of these agents is denoted b A t , and the real balances of Þat currency held for each agent is m A t = p t h A t , where h A t represents the nominal balances.
Asset return rates
Competition between banks, who may store goods deposited, ensures that
Similarly,
where
and ϕ t+1 ≥ 0 is the tax the government imposes, at date t + 1, on the returns on private assets -consumption loans or stored goods -acquired by the banks at date t. (See below.)
For Þat currency, we have
but real balances of Þat currency can be positive when R m t < ρ d t . This possibility grows out of our assumption that the government imposes a currency reserve requirement of λ t ∈ [0, 1] on banks that accept deposits at date t. Here λ t is the minimum fraction of the bank's total deposits that must be held in the form of Þat currency. In equilibria in which money is not valued we assume λ t = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Competition between banks ensures that the after-tax gross real deposit return rate
If R m t < ρ d t then the reserve requirement is binding and banks hold Þat currency only to satisfy the reserve requirement.
Taxes
The government may administer as many as two different tax systems: a lump sum tax system that helps Þnance government purchases (with an exception noted below) and a payas-you-go social security system.
Social security
The pay-as-you-go social security system may have as many as two different components: a lump-sum component and a saving-based component.
Lump-sum social security Under the lump-sum component of the social security system, at each date t ≥ 1 each young agent from Variety A pays a lump-sum social security tax of τ A 1t ≥ 0. At each date t ≥ 2 each old Variety A agent receives a pre-tax social security beneÞt of T A 2t ≤ 0, while at date 1 each old agent receives a pre-tax beneÞt of T 21 ≤ 0. The corresponding after-tax beneÞts are
where z t is the proportional tax rate on social security beneÞts of either type.
The lump-sum social security system may also include a proportional tax of ϕ t+1 ≥ 0 on the gross returns at date t + 1 on private assets acquired by the banks at date t. We will refer to this tax, somewhat misleadingly, as a "deposit tax."
Saving-based social security Under the saving-based component of the social security system, young Variety A agents must pay social security taxes equal to a fraction γ t ≥ 0 of their gross saving s A t . That is, Ψ A 1t = γ t s A t , where Ψ A 1t represents an agent's saving-based social security contribution. Old agents from Variety A receive saving-based social security beneÞts that they view as proportional to their contributions. Thus,
where υ t+1 is the after-tax social security replacement rate -the fraction of a young agent's saving-based contributions at date t that is returned to it, at date t + 1, in the form of social security beneÞts. The pre-tax social security beneÞts paid at any date t ≥ 1 are denoted Φ A 2t for t ≥ 2 and Φ 21 for date 1. We have
for t ≥ 2, and
Other taxes and tax totals
The government may impose additional lump sum taxes on agents of either or both varieties, and/or on the initial old, in order to Þnance government purchases and/or to supplement the consumption of the initial old. The taxes imposed on young and old members of generations t ≥ 1 will be denoted tx i 1t and tx i 2,t+1 , i = A, B. The tax or transfer imposed on the initial old agents will be denoted tx 21 The total lump-sum taxes or transfers imposed on members of generations t ≥ 1 during their lives are denoted T i 1t and T i 2,t+1 , i = A, B. We have
and
In addition,
Net-of-tax social security taxes or transfers excepted, the total taxes or transfers collected from the members of generations t ≥ 1 during their lives are denoted t i 1t and t i 2,t+1 , i = A, B. We have
¢ and
where t 21 denotes the analogous tax variable for the initial old.
Government budget constraint
The government must Þnance a real purchase of g ≥ 0 per young agent at each date t ≥ 1.
Abstracting from the social security system, the government's consolidated budget constraint at dates t ≥ 2 is
n¸.
The variables h t and b t represent the average nominal quantity of money and the average real present value of the bonds, respectively, issued (supplied) by the government per young agent at date t. At date 1, the government's consolidated budget constraint is
We assume that each component of social security system is Þnanced (separately) in an actuarially balanced fashion. Government purchases are Þnanced by currency and bond seigniorage, by lump-sum taxes that are not part of the social security system, and by taxes on social security beneÞts. Thus, we can break up the government budget constraints as follows:
for dates t ≥ 2 and
for date 1.
Household budget constraints
The budget constraints of a two-period-lived agent belonging to Variety A are
where it is assumed that s A
The Variety B budget constraints are
where it is assumed that s B t is optimally chosen to be negative, given the option to switch to the Variety A constraints by choosing s t > 0. The agents' intertemporal budget constraints are consequently
The budget constraints of the initial old agents are
Competitive equilibrium 2.7.1 Conditions
Credit market clearing requires
where µ A t ≡ m A t + b A t denotes the total real present value of holdings of government liabilities per Variety A agent. In a non-monetary equilibrium we must have m A t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. In a monetary equilibrium the currency market must clear, which requires
In a monetary equilibrium with a binding reserve requirement (with R m t < R t ), we must have
This condition follows from the fact that if R m t < R t , then banks will hold Þat currency only to satisfy a reserve requirement. In other monetary equilibria we must have
If there are government bonds outstanding then we must have
so that the bonds supplied by the government are demanded by the agents.
Definitions
We will study competitive equilibria of two general types: non-monetary equilibria and monetary equilibria.
Non-monetary equilibria In a non-monetary equilibrium we must have λ t = p t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. A non-monetary equilibrium then consists of sequences of positive return rates
be supported as a non-monetary equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system without deposit taxes, and vice-versa. 
Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as a lump-sum social security equilibrium, with no deposit taxes and no other taxes or transfers, in which b
Equation (36) implies that for dates t ≥ 2 we have "
Here R * t−1 is the rate of return on currency (and, in this economy, all other assets) from date t − 1 to date t. On the left-hand side of this equation, we may think of the term in square brackets as the "inßation tax rate" on real balances of currency (and, in this economy, government bonds) acquired at date t − 1 by the members of the generation born at that date; the remaining term is the value of those balances. In a steady state, the Þrst term would simplify to n − R * t−1 or, equivalently, to n − 1/Π * t−1 , where Π * t−1 is the gross inßation rate from date t − 1 to date t. On the right-hand side of the equation, the Þrst term is tax rate on the social security beneÞts received by the members of generation t − 1 and the second term is the value of those beneÞts.
Corollary 1 Suppose the government policy involves no currency or bonds, and no taxes or transfers except for a lump-sum social security policy. Suppose this policy supports an equilibrium with interest rate sequence {R * t } ∞ t=1 and social security taxes {τ A * 1t } ∞ t=1 , social security benefits tax rates z * t for t ≥ 1, and consumption allocation {c
Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as a currency-only monetary equilibrium, with no social security system, in which b m A t = τ A * 1t , with supplementary taxes or transfers b t
Reserve requirements
In this subsection, we study economies in which x ≥ 0 and storage may (or may not) occur.
We conÞne ourselves to studying monetary equilibria in which a reserve requirement is binding at each date. We show that any equilibrium of this type can be supported by a non-monetary equilibrium with a saving-based social security system, and vice versa. We also show that any monetary equilibrium with binding reserve requirements can be supported by a non-monetary equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system with a deposit tax. In addition, we
show that any monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements and government bonds can be supported by a monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements but no government bonds, or by a "monetary" equilibrium with government bonds, but no currency, and a saving-based social security system.
Saving-based social security
Theorem 2 Suppose the government policy features positive reserve requirements at each date (λ * t > 0 for all t ≥ 1) and no social security system or any other taxes or transfers, except at date 1. Suppose there is a monetary equilibrium in which the reserve requirements are binding at each date, with real return rate sequence {R * t } ∞ t=1 , real fiat currency balances sequence {m A * t } ∞ t=1 , real government bond holdings sequence {b A * t } ∞ t=1 , date 1 tax t * 21 and consumption allocation {c
Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as a saving-based social security equilibrium in which b
for t ≥ 2, where
In this case, we can write "
Here R µ * t−1 is the average gross real rate of return on government liabilities, weighted by the real holdings of these liabilities. It is also the gross real rate of return on currency -the inverse of the gross inßation rate -in an equivalent monetary equilibrium with government currency but no government bonds -see Proposition 1 below. Thus, we may think of the term in square brackets as the inßation tax rate in that equivalent equilibrium, while the second term on the left-hand-side is the inßation tax base in that equilibrium.
As this discussion indicates, an implication of Theorem 2 is that we can support the currency-and-bonds equilibrium featuring reserve ratios λ * t and currency return rates R m * t as a currency-only equilibrium featuring reserve ratios e λ t = µ A * t /s A * t .and currency return rate e R m t = R µ * t . 13 This result has independent importance, so we will state it and prove it as 
Proposition 1 implies that the results of any monetary policy experiment conducted under a regime featuring currency reserve requirements and unbacked government bonds, can be duplicated, across regimes, by an experiment in a regime of the same type without the unbacked debt.
As we have seen, when a monetary policy regime includes both currency and bonds, the implicit tax rate from the monetary equilibrium that corresponds to the explicit tax rate from the equivalent social security equilibrium (the tax rate on social security beneÞts) is the average return rate on both types of government liabilities. This return rate is different from (and higher than) the real return rate on the government's currency liabilities, which is the rate that determines the inßation tax rate. One alternative way to characterize the relationship between an inßation tax and a tax on social security beneÞts involves an equivalence result that is very closely related to Theorem 2. This result, which we will call Proposition 2, establishes that any monetary equilibrium with government currency, 13 Note that in the previous economy, where there were no binding reserve requirements, we could replace the bonds with currency, or vice-versa, rather trivially, since both had the same real rate of return. This is an example of the irrelevance of open market operations in economies of this type: see Sargent (1987, ch. 7) government debt and binding currency reserve requirements can be supported by a quasiÞscal equilibrium with unbacked government debt and a saving-based social security system, but no reserve requirements and no government currency. 14 And the inßation tax rate in the monetary equilibrium is equal to the direct tax rate on social security beneÞts in this quasi-Þscal equilibrium. 
Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as an equilibrium with no government currency, but government bonds and a saving-based social security system. This equilibrium features
for t ≥ 2 and
(The proof of this proposition will be omitted, since the required modiÞcations in the proof of Theorem 2 are quite trivial.)
We conclude this section by demonstrating that Theorem 1 works in the opposite direction, so that the two types of regimes, monetary and Þscal, really are entirely equivalent. We show, that is, that any equilibrium under a Þscal regime with a saving-based social security system can be supported as an equilibrium under a monetary regime with binding currency reserve requirements. There is one caveat; the social security policy cannot be so generous that its implicit return rate exceeds the return rate on privately-issued liabilities. Otherwise, the reserve requirement will not be binding.
Corollary 2 (to Theorem 2) Suppose the government policy features no currency or government bonds and no taxes or transfers except for a saving-based social security system with a sequence of social security contribution tax rates {γ * t } ∞ t=1 and a sequence of social security benefits tax rates {z 
, and social security benefits tax rates
In this case, unlike the previous ones, we cannot obtain this result in the other direction:
that is, we cannot show that any equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system partly supported by a deposit tax can be duplicated by a monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements but no deposit taxes. The reason for this is that most social security systems of this sort will not produce equilibria in which the after-tax rate of return on deposits is equal to the implicit rate of return on social security contributions.
The analogue of Proposition 2 holds for this type of social security regime: if the initial monetary equilibrium features currency, a currency reserve requirement, and unbacked bonds, then it can be duplicated by a monetary-Þscal equilibrium involving a lump-sum social security policy, a deposit tax, and unbacked bonds. And it is again true that the inßation tax rate in the purely monetary equilibrium is equal to the direct tax rate on social security beneÞts, adjusted for the population growth rate, in this equivalent monetary-Þscal equilibrium. Since this proposition and proof are very similar to their analogues in Bacchetta and
Caminal (1994), we do not present them here.
Examples
In this section, we describe two examples that help illustrate our results. The Þrst example is parametric and numerical. higher than the population growth rate. As a result, the government loses revenue from bond seigniorage, so its inßation tax revenue must be large enough both to cover these losses and to Þnance its real purchase.
We begin our equivalence analysis of this example by describing a money-only policy regime (no government debt) that supports the same equilibrium consumption allocation as the money-and-bonds regime just described. Compared to the money-and-bonds regime, the money-only regime features both a higher reserve ratio and a higher real currency return rate. In particular, the real currency return rate in the money-only steady state lies between the real currency return rate in the steady state under the mixed regime and the real bond return rate in that steady state.
Next, we describe two Þscal policy regimes that also support the same consumption allocation, despite the absence of currency or bonds. One of these regimes features a savingbased social security system, while the other features a lump-sum social security system supplemented by taxes on deposit returns. In each case, the total value of the social security contributions in the steady state under the Þscal policy regime is equal to the total real value of the stock of government liabilities (currency and bonds, or just currency) in the steady state under the monetary policy regime. And in each case, the rate at which social security beneÞts are taxed under the Þscal policy regime is equal to the inßation tax rate in the money-only monetary policy regime.
We continue this example by returning to the initial money-and-bonds equilibrium and conducting a policy experiment of the type described by Wallace (1984) . We hold the reserve ratio Þxed and imagine an "open market sale" that increases the ratio of bonds to currency, comparing the steady states under the old and new ratios. One result of this experiment that has attracted a good deal of attention is that the real bond rate and the real currency return rate change in opposite directions. Thus, the experiment produces a form of the "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" described by Sargent and Wallace (1981): a "tighter" monetary policy -a policy that involves more bonds and less currency, and that produces a higher real interest rate -leads to higher inßation rather than lower inßation. 15 As before, our next step is to construct the money-only regime that supports the postexperiment consumption allocation from money-and-bonds regime. When we compare this new money-only regime to the money-only regime that supported the pre-experiment allocation, we Þnd that the new regime has a higher reserve ratio. The new regime also features a higher real currency return rate -that is, a lower inßation rate -than the old moneyonly regime. Thus, the unpleasant-arithmetic result described in the preceding paragraph is revealed to be an artifact of the division of the real stock of government liabilities into two components with different real return rates. In an equivalent experiment without this division, the "monetarist arithmetic" is pleasant. 16 With the division, however, as the increase in the total stock of government liabilities crowds out private debt and drives the real interest rate upward, it also drives up the (equal) real interest rate on government bonds, forcing the real rate of return on currency to fall (and the inßation rate to rise) even though the average real return rate on government liabilities rises.
Next, we construct a savings-based social security regime that supports the same consumption allocation as the post-experiment monetary policy regimes. 17 Social security contributions and beneÞts are higher than they were under the social security policy that supported the pre-experiment allocation, but the tax rate on the social security beneÞts is lower. Thus, our monetary policy experiment is revealed to be equivalent to Þscal policy experiment that involves increasing the scale of a pay-as-you-go social security system. This 15 See Bhattacharya, Huybens and Smith (1998), Bhattacharya and Kudoh, (2001) and Russell (1998, 2001 ). 16 The equivalent experiment is an increase in the reserve ratio rather than an open market purchase. But a reserve ratio increase is generally considered to be a form of monetary tightening. Note that under Wallace's assumptions, which we follow, the total real stock of currency is Þxed, so that an open market sale (an increase in the bonds-money ratio) always increases the total real stock of government liabilities. 17 For the sake of completeness, we also describe the lump-sum social security policy, supplemented by deposit taxes, that supports the post-experiment steady state.
revelation helps illustrate the logic behind both types of experiments. In each case, a policy intervention increases the scale of government's intergenerational transfer system. The increased intergenerational transfers crowd out private lending and drive up the real interest rate. However, the fact that the transfers are larger allows the government to reduce the rate at which it taxes them without losing any revenue.
Example 2 involves a recent result by Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001) about the optimal rate of inßation. Their analytical framework is the reserve-requirements-with-storage model studied by Freeman (1987) . They use this model to determine whether it may be optimal for a government that cannot change the required reserve ratio to use the inßation tax as source of revenue, even when the alternative revenue source is tax is a lump-sum tax on young households. Somewhat surprisingly, they Þnd that in most cases some use of the inßation tax is optimal.
How can a distorting tax be superior to a non-distorting one? The answer lies in two of the results we have obtained in this paper. First, a monetary regime with a reserve requirement is equivalent to a Þscal regime with a pay-as-you-go social security system -a system which, as we have seen, is a bad one in Freeman's model. Second, the inßation tax is equivalent, across these two regimes, to a proportional tax on social security beneÞts.
Suppose that, under the monetary regime, the government increases the inßation rate and uses the additional currency seigniorage revenue to reduce the lump-sum tax on the young households. Across regimes, the increase in the inßation rate is exactly equivalent to an increase in the tax rate on social security beneÞts, and, thus, to a reduction in the size of the after-tax beneÞts. This reduction in the after-tax social security beneÞts Þnances a decrease in the lump-sum tax on the young households that is almost equivalent to a decrease in their social security contributions. 18 Thus, the equivalent (almost) policy has the effect of reducing the scale of the equivalent (almost) social security system. And since social security is welfare-reducing in this economy, it should be no surprise that increasing the inßation rate may be welfare-increasing. Indeed, the only reason greater reliance on the inßation tax does not always increase welfare is that taxing social security beneÞts at a higher rate increases the return distortion associated with the fact that the equivalent social security system is saving-based rather than lump-sum. 19 
Concluding remarks
Policy equivalence results have a long and important history in macroeconomics. In this paper, we extend the policy equivalence literature by studying equivalence between monetary regimes and Þscal regimes. In particular, we show that any allocation that can be supported by a monetary regime with Þat currency and/or unbacked government debt can also be supported by a Þscal regime with a pay-as-you-go social security system. We ob- 
, where we assume b
Thus,
so the members of generation t face the same combined budget constraints in the social security equilibrium. It follows that they will make the same consumption choices:
1t , c j * 2,t+1 ) for j = A, B and t ≥ 1. In a social security equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is
So if we further assume b k A t = k A * t then we have
which is the credit market clearing condition from the monetary equilibrium. Under the social security equilibrium, the government budget constraint at dates t ≥ 2, net of social security, is
n .
We have seen that this can be rewritten
which is the government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium. Under the social security system, the members of generation zero consume
and the government budget constraint is
We also have b
We know by hypothesis that b τ
and that
Thus, we have b c 21 = ω 2 − tx * 21 + p * 1 h 0 which is the budget constraint of the initial old households in the monetary equilibrium. In addition, we have
n which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the monetary equilibrium. ¤ Proof of Corollary 1: In the monetary equilibrium with supplementary taxes or transfers
, the intertemporal budget constraints of the members of generations t ≥ 1 are
If b R t = R * t , then these constraints become
which are the household budget constraints from the social security equilibrium. So households will choose b c
. In the monetary equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is α
which is the credit market clearing condition from the social security equilibrium, and thus holds by hypothesis.
In the monetary equilibrium, the government budget constraint for dates t ≥ 2 is
This constraint is equivalent to
This constraint reduces to
which is the government's net-of social-security budget constraint in the social security equilibrium. At date 1, in the monetary equilibrium, we must have
We have seen that b m A 1 = τ A * 11 . Suppose we choose b p 1 so that
Then we have b c 21 = c * 21 . In addition, the government budget constraint can be rewritten
And since we have T * 21 = −α n τ * 11 and τ * 21 = (1 − z * 1 ) T * 21 , this becomes
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the social security equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2:
In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the budget constraints facing households are
Given our choice for b γ t , this becomes
since m * t = λ t s * t . It follows that households face the same budget constraints in the social security equilibrium, which means they will make the same consumption choices: t . In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is
which is the credit market clearing condition from the monetary equilibrium. In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the government budget constraint is
So the social security constraint is equivalent to
which is the government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium. At date 1, in the social security equilibrium, we have
where b
We have seen that b
, and we have
giving us b c 21 = c * 21 . In addition, we have
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the monetary equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1:
In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, the budget constraints facing households are
The deposit rate e
Suppose e R t = R * t . Given our choices of e λ t and e R m t , we have
So both groups of households will make the same consumption and saving choices. Note that we must have e m A t = e λ t s A * t = µ A * t and e k A t = e s A t − e m A t = s A * t − µ A * t = k A * t . Since e R t = R * t implies e s B t = s B * t , it follows that the credit market clearing constraint continues to hold. In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, the government budget constraint for dates t ≥ 2 is
We have e m A t = µ A * t = m A * t + b A * t , so this becomes
hich is the government budget constraint for dates t ≥ 2 in the equilibrium.with bonds.
In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, at date 1, the consumption of the initial old is e c 21 = ω 21 − e τ 21 + e p 1 h 0 the government budget constraint is
It follows that
which is the government budget constraint (net of pre-tax social security) in the social security equilibrium.
In the monetary equilibrium, at date 1, the consumption of the initial old households is
We have seen that
, and we know that Φ * 21 = −α n Ψ A * 11 and
Then we have b c 21 = c * 21 . In addition, we have
Proof of Theorem 3:
In the social security equilibrium, the budget constraints of the two-period-lived households are
Thus, both varieties of household face the same interest rates as in the monetary equilibrium. In addition, b τ
by hypothesis, so the tax terms drop out of the Þrst constraint, and both varieties of households face the same budget constraints as in the monetary equilibrium. It follows that they make the same consumption decisions, that the Variety B households make the same saving decision, and that the saving of the Variety A households is b
constraints of the Variety A households, then the credit market clears in the social security equilibrium. At dates t ≥ 2, the government budget constraints in the social security equilibrium are
n , and
, and we have seen that b
We know s
using credit market clearing constraint from the monetary equilibrium. We have
This substitution gives us
This becomes
and we are using the fact that
which was established in the proof of Proposition 1. We now have
and it was shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that this constraint is equivalent to the consolidated (purchases plus transfers) government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium. We have b τ
We also have
So we have
At date 1, in the social security equilibrium, the initial old households consume
and the budget constraint of the government is
Appendix B Example 1
In this economy, n = 1, x = 0 and α = 1/2, with (ω
) and ω 2 = Next, we examine a fiscal regime built around a saving-based PAYG social security system, and we look for a fiscal policy that supports the same allocation in equilibrium. The government chooses a saving tax rate of b γ t = λ t to finance social security contributions, and a social security benefits tax rate of b z . = 0.0231431. Note that this benefits tax rate is equal to the inflation tax rate from the currency-only equilibrium. There is a stationary fiscal equilibrium in which b R = R * and b We continue this example by conducting a monetary policy experiment under the initial monetary regime and describing the equivalent policy experiments under the three equivalent regimes. The initial monetary policy experiment is an increase in the money growth rate from θ * = 1.2 to θ * * = 1.3, holding the reserve ratio fixed, so that λ * * = λ * . There is a stationary monetary equilibrium under this policy that features R * * . = 0.831144. Note that this ratio is higher than the initial ratio: we can follow Wallace (1984) by thinking of this experiment as a policy-induced increase in this ratio -an open market sale -accompanied by endogenous increases in the money growth and inflation rates Note also that the new inflation rate is higher than the initial inflation rate, so that this "policy tightening" causes the inflation rate to rise. The initial price leve1 is p * * 1 = p * 1 and the initial transfer is T Finally, in the fiscal regime with lump-sum PAYG social security and a deposit-returns tax, the equivalent policy experiment is an increase in social security contributions from e τ 
